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JOSEPH SMITH AND THE TRINITY: 
AN ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE OF THE SOCIAL 
MODEL OF THE GODHEAD
David Paulsen and Brett  McDonald
The theology of Joseph Smith remains controversial and at times divisive in 
the broader Christian community. This paper takes Smith’s trinitarian theol-
ogy as its point of departure and seeks to accomplish four interrelated goals: 
(1) to provide a general defense of “social trinitarianism” from some of the 
major objections raised against it; (2) to express what we take to be Smith’s 
understanding of the Trinity; (3) to analyze the state of modern ST and (4) to 
argue that, as a form of ST, Smith’s views contribute to the present discussion 
amongst proponents of ST.
Harold Bloom, the self-proclaimed “unbelieving Jew”1 and distinguished 
scholar, characterized Joseph Smith as “a religious genius,” stating that 
the religion he claimed to restore “is truly a biblical religion.”2 Many 
others, however, fi nd the religion Smith established to be diametrically 
opposed to the biblical witness. For example, a recent book claiming to 
be “truly groundbreaking and epoch-marking” challenges Mormonism’s 
adherence to the Bible in many respects and asserts, “Mormonism’s her-
esies are legion.”3
Biblical or heretical? It is quite an understatement to say that, since 
Smith returned from a private prayer in the woods near his home and 
announced that God had spoken to him, the doctrines he espoused have 
received mixed reactions. Smith’s critics base their arguments against his 
views (and in favor of their own) upon biblical exegesis, creedal inter-
pretation and philosophical analysis. On the other hand, Smith based the 
veracity of his views upon direct, personal revelation he claimed came 
from God. He was neither a philosopher nor a theologian per se, nor even 
a biblical scholar, although he oft en appealed to the Bible in support of his 
views. His controversial claim is epitomized by his declaration concerning 
“our condition and relationship to God”: “Could you gaze into heaven 
fi ve minutes, you would know more than you would by reading all that 
ever was writt en on the subject.”4
While Smith claimed many such gazes, it is not our intent here to in-
vestigate whether or not such claims are true, and, in accordance with this 
purpose, we will present his revelations as he understood and presented 
them, rather than repeatedly referring to them as “purported” revela-
tions. Instead, we will take as our point of departure one signifi cant area 
of resultant theology stemming from the visions Smith described:5 what 
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Smith’s theology has to say about trinitarian theorizing, a reemerging area 
of interest to Christian philosophers. Our purposes are fourfold: (1) to 
provide a general defense of “social trinitarianism” (hereaft er “ST”) from 
some of the major objections raised against it; (2) to express (as clearly 
and fully as space permits) what we take to be Smith’s understanding of 
the Trinity;6 (3) to analyze the state of modern ST and (4) to argue that, as 
a form of ST, Smith’s views contribute to the present discussion amongst 
proponents of ST.
I. Defense of ST
In order to set the stage for our upcoming discussion of ST it is necessary 
to fi rst establish its plausibility as an alternative to Latin trinitarianism 
(hereaft er “LT”).7 This objective may partly be accomplished by defeating 
the foremost objections to it.
(A) Tritheism and Arianism as Heresies
John Gresham has outlined the four major criticisms leveled against ST 
as (1) The Terminological Criticism, (2) The Monotheistic Criticism, (3) 
The Christological Criticism and (4) The Feminist Criticism.8 Gresham 
examines criticisms (1) and (4) and, because we believe that he shows 
their complete inadequacy, we will not comment further on either of 
these criticisms. However, in light of Brian Left ow’s strong formulations 
of the “monotheistic criticism” and the “Christological criticism” we oﬀ er 
the following in response.9 Left ow provides a succinct statement of the 
monotheistic criticism leveled against ST through what he calls the “hard 
tasks” for ST. According to Left ow, “one hard task for ST is to explain 
why its three Persons are ‘not three Gods, but one God’ and do so with-
out transparently misreading the Creed.”10 This monotheistic criticism 
has also been expressed in terms of its corollary, namely, the accusation 
of tritheism.11
Like many terms describing heresies, tritheism is oft en used with an 
apparent lack of understanding for its historical application. It is asserted 
by some that tritheism is simply the idea of three gods, no matt er how 
the idea is understood. For example, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen state, 
“What must be argued is that the three persons of the Trinity are only one 
God; in other words that they are one God only, and not in any sense also 
three Gods.”12 Others assert that tritheism is the idea of three diﬀ erent 
Beings, each of whom “happens to be” divine.13 In this rendering, trithe-
ism consists of not appropriately expressing the unity among the beings. 
Stephen Davis has asserted that the idea of the Father, Son and Holy 
Ghost actually constituting a society or community makes one a trithe-
ist, whereas the idea that the relationship between Father, Son and Holy 
Ghost is in some ways like (or analogous to) a society or community allows 
one to avoid tritheism.14 While all these accusations draw the boundary 
of heresy at diﬀ erent points, they are all historically imprecise. As Corne-
lius Plantinga points out, the problem is not three distinct persons who 
may each properly be called “a God,” (consider Thomas’s statement to 
the resurrected Christ: “My Lord, my God”); the real problem is three 
ontologically graded gods.
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In the fourth and fi ft h centuries, when the doctrine of the Trinity 
was being developed, there were particular limits on orthodoxy and, 
accordingly, particular positions outside orthodoxy. As already sug-
gested, virtually everybody who writes on the Trinity during this 
period identifi es the monist heresy as some form of modalism, and 
then specifi es that modalism is unacceptable because it allows belief 
in only one person. I now want to add that the heresy on orthodoxy’s 
pluralist side is specifi able as well. And it is surely not the view that 
God includes three distinct persons . . . what is heretical is belief in 
three ontologically graded distinct persons.15
J. N. D. Kelly agrees that the pole of the tritheistic heresy was Arius who 
aﬃ  rmed that there is one God (the Father) who is unique, transcendent 
and indivisible, and whose being or essence cannot be shared or com-
municated.16 Thus, the Son is a creature formed ex nihilo who cannot have 
any communion with or direct knowledge of the Father. It will simply not 
do then for critics of ST to maintain, with Left ow, that belief in three dis-
tinct beings amounts to the historical heresy of tritheism. ST and the pre-
creedal Origen are “not afraid to speak in one sense of two Gods, in another 
sense of one God.”17 ST contends with Origen that the error of modalism 
lies in treating the Three as numerically indistinguishable and separable 
only in thought. As will be shown below, ST has no problem using the 
word “God” in diﬀ erent ways.
Left ow’s preoccupation with numerals is further illustrated by his 
comment, “A second hard task for ST is providing an account of what 
monotheism is which both is intuitively acceptable and lets ST count as 
monotheist.”18 In response, it fi rst ought to be pointed out that the word 
“monotheism” occurs nowhere in the Old or New Testaments. What oc-
curs in the Christian scriptures is the assertion that “one” God rules in the 
heavens. We argue below that with the acknowledgment of Jesus Christ 
as a person wholly divine yet distinct from the Father, this “one” can and 
should be understood in functional rather than numeric terms. ST con-
tends that the relationship of Jesus and His God as portrayed in the New 
Testament is the key to understanding immanent trinitarian functions. 
William Hasker expresses this “crucial issue” in terms of a question:
Is the relationship between Jesus and the Father, as depicted in the 
Gospels, only the relationship of a man with his God, similar to that 
enjoyed by other men, though perhaps on a higher spiritual plane? 
Or is Jesus also “God, the Son of God,” and was his relationship with 
the Father not only a relationship between a man and God—though 
it was that—but also the relationship, lived out on earth, between the 
eternal Son and his eternal Father—a relationship, in fact, between 
God and God? This is the question of all questions for the doctrine of 
the Trinity.19
If this relationship is understood as between God and God, then adher-
ence to so-called “strict Jewish monotheism” seems out of the question. 
Left ow’s insistence that the Christian Godhead, “should be a monothe-
ism a Jew could accept as monotheistic” is not only question-begging 
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but also shows a lack of historical awareness and biblical scholarship. In 
particular, Jewish views were not uniform; there was a diversity of views 
about God and God’s relation to the “sons of God” and other divine be-
ings in Second Temple Judaism. Which Jews does Left ow have in mind? 
Jews of the Second Temple era like those who wrote the Dead Sea Scrolls 
and accepted an entire council of gods and divine beings like Michael? 
Modern Jews who reject the incarnation of the Son of God? First-century 
Jews, of whom Jesus said, “Ye neither know me, nor my Father”?20 If pre-
messianic Jews, is it preexilic Jews or postexilic Jews? If the response is 
“all of them,” this proves extremely problematic. While space does not 
allow for full recapitulation of all the relevant studies in this area, schol-
ars remain less than certain whether the religion of ancient Israel can 
even be called “monotheistic” and if it can, just how that is the case.21 ST, 
and as will be shown, Joseph Smith, argue that monotheism should not 
be understood as a strictly numerical concept. The question of whether 
or not this rendering is “intuitive” must be left  to the reader.
(B) Social Trinitarianism and the Creeds
If ST is biblical, which it seems to be, the question remains whether it can 
be creedal. As Left ow puts it, are proponents of ST “transparently mis-
reading the Creed”?22 To this, we answer no, for if scholarship has proved 
anything in relation to the terms used in the creeds, it is that they set the 
limits of orthodoxy very broadly and provide suﬃ  cient room for a ST 
reading.23
While a full investigation into the doctrinal disputes of Nicaea is be-
yond the scope of this paper, it must be pointed out “that those who had 
signed the Nicene Creed could not agree on what it meant.”24 Consider 
the critical term of Nicaea, homoousios. Although not included in the fi rst 
draft  of the creed, Constantine, the as-yet unbaptized emperor, requested 
its insertion.25 In his comprehensive study of the term (and the idea of 
substance), Christopher Stead comments,
Finally we have to consider the term homoousios as it occurs in the 
Nicene Creed; what were its immediate antecedents, and what was 
its meaning? These two questions have been repeatedly discussed, 
but without reaching assured conclusions.
There is, moreover, too litt le trustworthy evidence for the use of 
the term in the years immediately preceding Nicaea. Scholars have 
therefore had to rely, partly on certain broad historical projections, 
partly on the reports of the Council presented by Eusebius and Atha-
nasius; of whom the former has come under suspicion as oﬀ ering 
a tendentious account of the proceedings, designed to excuse his 
reluctant subscription, while the latt er, whether or not he displays 
an opposing Tendenz, records his impressions of the Council aft er a 
lapse of twenty-fi ve years.26
Stead then elucidates three possible ways in which homoousios could be 
viewed.27 He concludes:
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Homoousios guarantees very litt le; it can be used of things which re-
semble one another merely in belonging to the created order, or to 
the category of substance; it can relate collaterals to each other, or 
derivatives with their source; it does not exclude inequality of status 
or power.28
William Alston concurs with Stead, writing, “and because of this ambigu-
ity the crucial statement of the Nicene creed that the Son is ‘homoousios with 
the Father’ is likewise ambiguous.”29 Indeed, for more than fi ft y years aft er 
Nicaea, the Church debated exactly what it had aﬃ  rmed. Various alterna-
tives were tried: “Exact image of the Godhead” (Second Creed of Antioch, 
341); “Like the Father who begot Him according to the Scriptures” (Dated 
Creed, Fourth of Sirmium); “Of like essence with the Father” (Ancyra, 
358); “Unlike the Father” (the teaching of Aetius and Eunomius and, by 
implication, of the Second Creed of Sirmium, 357).30 Lastly, consider the 
uncertainty of Hilary of Poitiers concerning the term homoousion:
“It is a thing,” says Hilary, “equally deplorable and dangerous, that 
there are as many creeds as opinions among men, as many doc-
trines as inclinations, and as many sources of blasphemy as there 
are faults among us; because we make creeds arbitrarily, and explain 
them away as arbitrarily. The homoousion is rejected, and received, 
and explained away by successive synods. The partial or total re-
semblance of the Father and the Son is a subject of dispute for these 
unhappy times. Every year, nay, every moon, we make new creeds 
to describe invisible mysteries. We repent of what we have done, 
we defend those who repent, we anathematize those whom we have 
defended. We condemn either the doctrine of others in ourselves, or 
our own in that of others; and, reciprocally tearing one another to 
pieces, we have been the cause of each other’s ruin.”31
If the originators and those who immediately followed could come to 
no consensus concerning the meaning of the creed, it is clear that mod-
ern Christians are not bound to a homogenous interpretation of it.32 Pro-
ponents of ST (including Mormons) can accept the Nicene Creed as a 
declaration of the full divinity of Jesus Christ while rejecting the ontologi-
cal identity of the three divine persons. This point is important and worth 
repeating: the Nicene Creed can be (and was historically) interpreted in 
varying ways, by varying groups, with varying theological commitments. 
Any number of persons, including modalists and proponents of ST, can 
subscribe to the creed, each producing its own studies to show why 
homoousios ought to be understood in a particular way.
The other technically critical words in trinitarian discourse, namely 
ousia and hypostasis, suﬀ er from the same historical ambiguity as 
homoousios.33 Consider Joseph Lienhard’s hesitation to strictly defi ne these 
terms, “I do not oﬀ er a uniform translation of ousia and hypostasis. Such 
a refusal arises not only from cowardice, but also from the recognition 
of a fact: fourth-century authors themselves were wary of explaining the 
meaning of the two words, and generally resorted to comparisons rather 
than defi nitions.”34
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As a result of this brief historical inquiry it is evident that the monothe-
istic criticism is in fact an issue of Arianism, which in turn is the Christo-
logical criticism. If ST is to avoid this criticism it must aﬃ  rm (1) that the 
Son is uncreate and eternal and (2) that the Son is fully God. Can it do 
so while remaining biblically faithful and internally consistent? We argue 
that it can and that Smith’s ideas provide insight into many of the current 
issues surrounding ST as it tries to satisfy the above criteria. Before dis-
cussing what contributions Smith’s thought provides to the ST debate, we 
fi rst turn to an explication of Smith’s trinitarian model, a model we shall 
call “Elyonic Monotheism.”
II. Smith’s View of the Godhead
(A) Three Distinct Divine Persons or “Three Gods”
In 1842, as part of a response to a Chicago newspaperman’s inquiry as to 
what “Mormons” believed, Joseph Smith penned thirteen basic beliefs, 
which have come to be known as “The Articles of Faith.” Though not in-
tended as such, they remain the closest Mormon analog to a creed. The 
fi rst of these articles aﬃ  rms belief in the New Testament Godhead: “We 
believe in God, the Eternal Father, and in His Son, Jesus Christ, and in 
the Holy Ghost.”35 Thus, this fi rst Article of Faith identifi es a trinitarian 
Godhead, though it does so without declaring how the members of the 
Godhead relate to one another. However, as if to underscore the signifi -
cance accorded the question by addressing it through the fi rst Article of 
Faith, numerous other revelations, writings, and speeches speak to the 
issues of both unity and distinctness within the Trinity. Clearly, this was 
an issue about which Smith had much to say.
In his last public sermon prior to his death, Smith declared,
I have always and in all congregations when I have preached on 
the subject of the Deity, it has been the plurality of Gods. . . . I have 
always declared God to be a distinct personage, Jesus Christ a sepa-
rate and distinct personage from God the Father, and that the Holy 
Ghost was a distinct personage and a Spirit: and these three consti-
tute three distinct personages and three Gods.36
This aﬃ  rmation was also based upon revelation. Of such, Smith wrote: 
“Any person that had seen the heavens opened knows that there are three 
personages in the heavens who hold the keys of power, and one presides 
over all.”37 Smith understood the power held by these three persons to 
be supreme power (including supreme creative power, ruling power, and 
redeeming power).38
Note that Smith did not teach that the Godhead was three diﬀ erent 
modes or manifestations of the same person or being.39 Nor did he suggest 
that the Godhead was in some way merely like or analogous to three per-
sons; he taught that it actually consists of three distinct persons. While all 
trinitarians maintain there are three divine persons in some sense, Smith 
distinguishes them with particular force and clarity. For Smith, each of 
these persons is uncreate and self-existent.40 This is an important point and 
JOSEPH SMITH AND THE TRINITY 53
bears some elaboration. For Smith, at any time t the existence of each of 
the Father, Son and Holy Ghost is an unchanging fact about the universe. 
None depends upon the others for his existence, nor could one annihilate 
either of the others. In this sense, we could say that the divine persons are 
“ontologically independent.” This point will be further developed below, 
in comparison with other formulations of ST.
In addition to metaphysical necessity and self-existence, Smith’s rev-
elations depict each divine person as possessing his own mind, or center 
of consciousness. For instance, consider this portrayal of the Son’s post-
resurrection pleading (or interceding) with the Father:
Listen to him who is the Advocate with the Father, who is pleading 
your case before him: Saying Father behold the suﬀ ering and death 
of him who did no sin, in whom thou wast well pleased; behold 
the blood of thy Son which was shed, the blood of him whom thou 
gavest that thyself might be glorifi ed: wherefore Father spare these 
my brethren that believe on my name, that they may come unto me 
and have everlasting life.41
“Him,” “thou,” “thy,” “thyself,” “my,” “me”: such language is abundant 
in Smith’s revelations, portraying interactive relations between the Father 
and the Son. Smith taught that the mind, speech and actions of both the 
Son and the Holy Ghost are distinct from the Father’s mind, speech and 
actions. Furthermore, according to Smith, each of the three possesses his 
own will. The Book of Mormon implores readers to “choose eternal life, 
according to the will” of the Holy Spirit.42 The Doctrine and Covenants 
discloses Jesus’ agony in Gethsemane and distinguishes between his will 
and that of the Father.43 However, while it is clear that the Holy Ghost and 
the Son each possess their own distinct will, as shall be discussed below, it 
is the Father’s will that they seek to accomplish. Thus, in another revelation 
Christ proclaims, “I am Jesus Christ; I came by the will of the Father, and I 
do his will,” and in relation to the His atoning sacrifi ce, He declares, “I . . . 
accomplished and fi nished the will of him whose I am, even the Father.”44
Further evidence of Smith’s strong notion of the distinct personhood of 
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit is found in his portrayal of each as being 
profoundly passible. The Son experiences emotions distinct from those of 
the Father, while the Father experiences emotions distinct from those of the 
Son.45 In bodily form, each resembles the manifestation of Jesus incarnate, 
both in his mortal and glorifi ed resurrected bodily states.46 For Smith, there 
are literally three distinct divine persons—or, as he boldly chose to say near 
the end of his life, “three Gods.” Each of these persons is independently 
self-existent and each possesses his own distinct center of consciousness, 
will and emotions. For Smith, the proposition that there are three distinct 
persons in the Godhead appears to express a nonnegotiable fact, with which 
any acceptable account of the unity of the Godhead would have to cohere.
(B) Smith’s Views: One God
Notwithstanding his explicit declaration that the Father, Son and Holy 
Ghost are “three distinct personages and three Gods,” Smith’s revelations 
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also repeatedly aﬃ  rm that “the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, 
are one God.”47 At face value, these two aﬃ  rmations appear to be fl atly 
contradictory.48 However, closer inspection discloses that the contradiction 
is apparent only, resulting from Smith’s equivocal use of the term “God.” 
It is therefore important to briefl y examine what Smith meant by the term 
“one God,” and show how these statements, when correctly understood, 
are actually consistent with his aﬃ  rmation of three distinct divine per-
sons, or “three Gods.”
One critic of ST has writt en, “The Trinity is an illogical paradox if the 
three-in-oneness it refers to is conceived in the terms of mathematical 
logic, that is, if the concept of the oneness of the Trinity is understood 
primarily as a strictly mathematical number 1.”49 Smith obviously did 
not understand biblical oneness scriptures as asserting numerical unity. 
For instance, in interpreting an oft -quoted oneness passage, Smith says, 
“I want to read the text to you myself [John 17:21]—‘I am agreed with the 
Father and the Father is agreed with me, and we are agreed as one.’ The 
Greek shows that it should be agreed.”50
Rather than understanding their oneness as an identity of being, Smith 
saw the oneness of the Godhead as, amongst other things, a unity in heart, 
mind, will, att ributes and nature. Smith understood this unity to be a 
result of the willing and free choice of the divine persons to align their 
distinct wills. Indeed, Smith specifi cally taught that an “everlasting cov-
enant was made between three personages [Father, Son and Holy Ghost] 
before the organization of this earth, and relates to their dispensation of 
things to men on the earth.”51 Smith understood this covenant to consist 
of each of the three divine beings covenanting with the others to fulfi ll a 
specifi c role in relation to the salvation of the human family. The Father, 
according to Smith, is God “the fi rst”52 and presides “over all,”53 and it 
is the Father’s plan of creation and redemption that the Son carries out.54 
Thus, Smith refers to the Son as God “the second” and as “the Redeemer” 
and “the Mediator.”55 According to Smith, God “the third,” or Holy Ghost, 
is “the witness or Testator.”56 Because of their covenant relationship, a syn-
ergetic bond exists between the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, the nature of 
which is distinctive to the Trinity. This bond was forged not only out of 
their oneness of minds, hearts, natures and att ributes, but also out of their 
interdependent missions.
In a sermon, Smith asked, “What did Jesus do?” and provided a para-
phrased answer: “Why, I do the things I saw my Father do . . . when I get 
my kingdom, I shall present it to My Father, so that He may obtain king-
dom upon kingdom, and it will exalt Him in glory.”57 Meanwhile, as Jesus 
performed the roles of a savior and redeemer of the Father’s creations, 
Smith viewed the Holy Ghost as a person charged with yet another dis-
tinct mission, a portion of which he elucidated in an editorial:
We believe that the holy men of old spake as they were moved by 
the Holy Ghost, and that holy men in these days speak by the same 
principle; we believe in its being a comforter and a witness bearer, 
that it brings things past to our remembrance, leads us into all truth, 
and shows us of things to come; we believe that ‘no man can know 
that Jesus is the Christ, but by the Holy Ghost.’58
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Thus, as the Father needs the Son and Holy Ghost to accomplish his 
purposes, so do the Son and Holy Ghost need and look to the Father 
for direction, power and exaltation. By their acts of mutual service, each 
fulfi lls, and is fulfi lled in, the others. The Book of Mormon declares this 
unity of will to be complete by saying of Jesus Christ, “Yea, even so he 
shall be led, crucifi ed, and slain, the fl esh becoming subject even unto 
death, the will of the Son being swallowed up in the will of the Father.”59 
In explaining this passage, LDS philosopher Blake Ostler observes:
There is only one God because the will of the Son is “swallowed up” 
in the will of the Father. There are clearly two wills, for the Son has 
a will that is distinct from the Father’s will, but he willingly subor-
dinates his will to the Father’s will so that only one will is actually 
expressed in the divine relationship, i.e., the Father’s. In this sense, 
by completely subordinating his will to the Father’s will it follows 
that the Father’s will is always realized and thus the one God is, in 
this sense, both the Father and the Son.60
Thus, while the Son and Holy Ghost possess distinct minds and wills and 
exhibit distinct actions, the Godhead thinks, wills and acts ad extra as one. 
This is shown explicitly in Jesus’ pre-incarnate declaration in the Book 
of Mormon: “Behold, I come unto my own . . . to do the will, both of the 
Father and of the Son.”61 As explained above, it is the will of the Father 
that the Son and Holy Ghost freely take as their own. This loving and free 
choice of the divine persons to align their wills is expressed in Smith’s 
revelations through the assertions that there is only one doctrine,62 judg-
ment,63 baptism64 and record65 of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Again, 
as Smith declared, “Any person that had seen the heavens opened knows 
that there are three personages in the heavens who hold the keys of power, 
and one [the Father] presides over all.”66
Along with explaining the concept of “one God” as relating to a unity 
of will, Smith also taught that there is “one God” in the sense of only one 
type of “God-nature” or set of att ributes, severally necessary and jointly 
suﬃ  cient, for divinity. We believe that the late Latt er-day Saint Apostle 
Elder James E. Talmage provides a clear explanation of how the posses-
sion of a qualitatively indistinguishable set of characteristics makes the 
Godhead “one”:
This unity is a type of completeness; the mind of any one member 
of the Trinity is the mind of the others; seeing as each of them does 
with the eye of perfection, they see and understand alike. Under any 
given conditions each would act in the same way, guided by the same 
principles of unerring justice and equity.67
While the divine nature includes maximal power, knowledge, justice 
and mercy, Smith understood “the greatest of all” to be love: namely, 
each God is God ultimately because He possesses maximal love.68 As 
will be developed more fully below, Smith’s view of love as “one of the 
chief characteristics of Deity” is key to understanding the type of “tri-
unity” he described.69 For Smith, then, the unity of the Godhead does not 
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reduce to logical necessity, but instead rests most fundamentally in the 
binding power of love.70
Finally, Smith viewed the biblical designation of Jesus as “the Son of 
the living God”71 as much more than an “analogy” of the genetic relation-
ship that would naturally exist between a father and son. The leadership 
of the LDS Church issued a doctrinal exposition (based on Smith’s teach-
ings) that states: “[God] is literally the Father of the spirit of Jesus Christ 
and also of the body in which Jesus Christ performed His mission in the 
fl esh.”72 Thus, not only are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost to be consid-
ered “one God” in terms of will, purpose and nature but are also linked 
through a very literal familial relationship.73
What has been said concerning Smith’s understanding of the unity of 
the Godhead may be summarized as follows: The persons of the Trinity 
are united as one God (a) through a foundation of profound and abiding 
love, (b) in their familial relationships, (c) in an “everlasting covenant” 
that unites their activity and wills and (d) in “the same fullness” of divine 
att ributes.
To repeat a very important point: in Smith’s revelations and discourses, 
the word “God” is used equivocally to designate, amongst other things, 
each individual divine person (but especially the Father), the perfectly 
united divine community, and the divine nature. To avoid misunder-
standing while reading Mormon texts, it is imperative to keep these mul-
tiple uses of the word “God” in mind.74 Consistent with his revelations, 
when Smith declares there are “three Gods,” he means that there are three 
individual persons, each of whom is divine. When he aﬃ  rms that there is 
“one God,” he means that either there is one God the Father, one perfectly 
united divine community or one generic divine nature.75
III. Contemporary Social Trinitarianism: Agreement
The revival of ST has been described as “one of the most signifi cant devel-
opments in contemporary theology.”76 Along with this revival has come a 
certain amount of confusion concerning what exactly qualifi es as a social 
model of the Trinity. Indeed, a wide variety of views of the Trinity, which 
contradict each other at crucial points, all lay claim to the social model. 
This in turn has caused even greater confusion, as critics provide argu-
ments directed at a specifi c form of ST which may have no application 
to other forms.77 While all who aﬃ  rm ST agree on a few key issues, there 
remains much work to be done in the refi nement and working-out of any 
version of ST.
Perhaps what is most agreed upon by proponents of ST is the inade-
quacy of so-called Western theology’s att empts at explicating the doctrine 
of the Trinity. In contrast to Western theology’s beginning with the one 
essence, the oft -quoted explanation of ST is that it begins with the three 
persons. This methodological departure from the norm forms a basic, and 
most simple, defi nition of ST. As Jürgen Moltmann explains, “we are be-
ginning with the Trinity of the Persons and shall then go on to ask about 
the unity.”78 This much is consistent in all models of ST. They each seek 
fi rst to explain “three what?” before answering “one what?” In doing so, 
they oft en use New Testament evidence as foundational axioms. Leonard 
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Hodgson, a forerunner of the modern movement, was adamant in as-
serting the primacy of the “biblical evidence.”79 Leonardo Boﬀ ’s stated 
thesis is typical of ST methodology: “I propose to try a third way [of un-
derstanding the Trinity], starting decisively from the Trinity, from Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit as revealed in the scriptures and as apparent from 
the historical actions of Jesus Christ.”80 Besides forming a foundation for 
ST, New Testament evidence is being used as a constraint on trinitarian 
theorizing. Scott  Horrell’s thesis is admirable in this respect: “My primary 
assertion is that the speculations of trinitarian theology are not to super-
sede revelation.”81
While many writers claim that anyone who maintains that the Trinity 
consists of three distinct divine individuals is a Social Trinitarian,82 we 
argue that other important factors must supplement this criterion in deter-
mining what constitutes a rationally persuasive and biblically consistent 
social model of the trinity. Specifi cally, we will address four issues in ST 
that currently lack consensus: (A) Internal Consistency, (B) Biblical Cor-
respondence and the Resurrected Christ, (C) Power and Decision Making 
and (D) Perichoresis and Trinitarian “Glue.”
IV. Current Issues in ST and Smith’s Contributions
(A) Internal Consistency
In his watershed and lucid treatment of ST, Cornelius Plantinga presents 
a biblically faithful and internally consistent model that sets the stan-
dard for future theorizing. For Plantinga, the “one what?” question in 
the Trinity is answered in three specifi c ways. There is “only one font of 
divinity, only one Father, only one God in that sense of God,”83 there is 
“only one divine essence or set of excellent properties severally neces-
sary and jointly suﬃ  cient for their possessor to be divine,” and there is 
“only one divine family or monarchy or community, namely, the Holy 
Trinity itself.”84 Other theologians have sought to answer the “one what?” 
question with varying levels of success. Despite their insistence on the 
real and distinct personhood of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, many 
of these versions of ST fall prey to the traditional trinitarian habit of tak-
ing back with one hand what they have just given with the other. For 
example, some versions of ST assert that while Father, Son and Spirit are 
divine, only the Trinity is most appropriately God.85 These models have 
been labeled “Trinity Monotheism”86 by Left ow, a fi tt ing description be-
cause for them only one thing is most appropriately God, namely the 
Trinity itself. While this approach saves the numerical unity of the three, 
it clearly violates what for ST and Christianity is fundamental, namely, 
that each person of the Trinity is fully God. This defect, in our judgment, 
certainly disqualifi es it as a strong or social model of the Godhead.
Other models, which Left ow calls “Group Mind Monotheism,”87 place 
the unity of the Trinity in a shared mind. “Group Mind” monotheism 
asserts that the three divine Persons have but one mind between them, 
which is God or the mind of the one God, or that they comprise a fourth 
divine mind.88 Even if intelligible, this approach quite clearly rules out any 
real distinctness of the trinitarian persons.89
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Another example of a less-than-adequate att empt to develop an inter-
nally consistent version of ST is that of William Hasker. Throughout his 
paper “Tri-Unity,” Hasker does an admirable job developing “a recon-
struction of the doctrine of the Trinity developed in terms of contempo-
rary philosophy of mind.”90 In so doing he defi nes a person’s nature as a 
specifi cation of “a set of characteristics which together delimit the range of 
[a person’s] actual and possible experiences within the fi eld of all possible 
experiences.”91 Thus, Hasker continues,
If we agree to call the continuing characteristics of a given individual 
his ‘dispositions,’ then his nature is the ontological ground of the disposi-
tions. Or to put it diﬀ erently, the nature is that in virtue of which the 
self is able to have experiences of various kinds; it is the real capacity 
or the real potentiality for having such experiences. Or again, the self 
as subject is that which acts or has experiences; its nature is that by 
which it does so.92
In a footnote, Hasker points out the obvious in regards to the nature of a 
person being a universal or particular: “it should be clear that natures, as 
here defi ned are particular rather than universal; each individual person has 
his own distinct nature. (There is, however, no logical reason why two per-
sons might not have natures which are qualitatively indistinguishable.)”93 
So far, Hasker’s account is both illuminating and seemingly helpful. How-
ever, it is in his application to the persons of the Trinity that Hasker’s thesis 
seemingly falls into incoherence.
In explaining what he takes to be one about the Godhead Hasker asserts, 
“The doctrine of the Trinity, stated in these terms, means that the one indi-
vidual and indivisible Nature of God is possessed by three Subjects, each of whom 
is really distinct from the other two.”94 Hasker’s apparent contradiction can be 
stated in formal terms, for he asserts:
(1)  Natures are particulars, that is, “each individual person has his 
own distinct nature.”95
(2)  The Trinity consists of three persons, “each Person is to each other 
Person as an ‘I’ to a ‘Thou.’”
(3)  The persons of the Trinity share “the one individual and indivisible 
Nature of God,”96 not only generically, but “numerically.”97
How does Hasker explain this contradiction? He does not, but in another 
footnote admits, “At this point the question naturally arises: How is it that 
the same individual divine Nature is possessed by three distinct Subjects? 
This of course has been answered in classical trinitarianism by saying that 
the Son and the Holy Spirit ‘proceed’ from the Father—but that is another 
story.”98 Unless this story is told in a logically satisfying way, Hasker’s 
model remains internally inconsistent. There is of course a way out for 
Hasker, and that is to admit that the persons of the Trinity each possess 
a distinct nature, but assert that these natures are, in his words, “quali-
tatively indistinguishable.” Hasker’s att empt seems to be one of trying 
to maintain some sort of ontological oneness, and such endeavors are, of 
course, nothing new.
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(B) Biblical Correspondence
While the tendency to aﬃ  rm some sort of ontological oneness within the 
Trinity has been the dominant tradition in the West since some time aft er 
Nicaea,99 we maintain, with Smith, that any such att empts cannot do jus-
tice to the Biblical witness of Jesus’ physical resurrection.
As a modern witness to the historically indispensable doctrine of the 
resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, Smith’s witness presses this Christo-
logical issue into the trinitarian discussion. Smith oft en accused sectarian 
ministers of trying to “stuﬀ ” the Father, Son and Holy Ghost into “one 
body.”100 While seemingly naïve, Smith’s point can be stated in more so-
phisticated terms, bringing the issue into focus. Smith believed, based 
upon the Bible and personal experience, that Jesus currently possesses a 
resurrected body complete with “fl esh and bones.”101 This body is his and 
not God the Father’s. If the question is one of “counting God,” then this 
resurrected body must be counted or, at least, accounted for.
We have noticed, in the academic arena, a lack of integration between 
the doctrine of the bodily resurrection of God the Son102 and theological 
models of the Trinity. For example, William Alston says, “The basic trou-
ble is that it simply does not seem at all appropriate to think of incorporeal 
persons being constituted of any material or stuﬀ .”103 Furthermore, Keith 
Yandell asserts, “By nature, God is not located in space. . . . Hence one can-
not distinguish between one trinitarian member and another by reference 
to spatial properties (God has none).”104 No explanation is given as to why 
the Son, aft er aﬃ  rming his bodily resurrection to many, is now incorpo-
real or lacks spatial properties. Did Jesus leave his resurrected body? The 
biblical witness seems to condemn this idea, for as James says, “the body 
without the spirit is dead,”105 and according to Paul’s testimony, “Christ 
being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion 
over him. For in that he died, he died unto sin once: but in that he liveth, 
he liveth unto God.”106
To remain consistent with the biblical witness Christian theologians 
must maintain a Son whose spirit possesses a distinct physical body. As 
argued above, it seems that Jesus’ spirit, once reunited with his body 
through resurrection will not and cannot be separated from his body. If 
Jesus’ body is not the Father’s body and Jesus’ spirit will forever inhabit 
his body, it seemingly follows that the Father and the Son are not one 
identical Spirit. Thus, if Christianity maintains (as it has historically) that 
God is a Spirit, then the Spirit of the Father must be distinguishable from 
that of the Son because one inhabits a body eternally that the other does 
not. For adherents of ST, the resurrected Son seems to necessitate the real 
ontological distinctness of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Indeed, any 
att empt to identify the oneness of the Trinity through ontology seems 
incoherent in the face of Jesus’ physical resurrection. Furthermore, the 
reality of the resurrection seems to pose a problem for the LT who 
deplores counting more than one numerical God. The possession of a cor-
poreal body by the Son seems to preclude the persons being diﬀ erentiated 
by “relationship” or “name” only.
Perhaps it may be responded that, since it is well accepted in Western 
Christianity that Christ was both fully human and fully divine, Christ’s 
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embodiment can be an aspect of only his human nature and not his divine 
nature. Thus, since the Father and the Son share only the same divine na-
ture and not the human nature, Christ can have a resurrected body and the 
divine nature without the Father sharing His body.107 We believe that this 
response fails on several grounds: fi rst, it fails to respond to the fact that, 
while incarnate, Jesus was fully God in that His human nature and His divine 
nature resided in a physical body, thus leaving the problem of the Father’s 
spirit’s location unresolved. Moreover, the biblical record clearly indicates 
that Jesus’ body was itself divine in the sense that it is “spiritual” and “glori-
ous” (1 Cor. 15:44; Philip. 3:21); why would Jesus’ divine nature not reside 
in His resurrected, spiritual and glorious body in a way that proves prob-
lematic to the supposed numeric identity of the Father and Son? Finally, the 
radical separation of the human nature from the divine nature needed for 
this argument tends too readily toward Nestorianism, the belief that two 
persons, one human and one divine, are embodied in Christ.
With the failure of this att empted resolution, other responses suggest 
themselves. Perhaps the fact that spatial predicates apply to the Son but 
not the Father can simply be understood in a similar fashion to other pred-
icates. Traditional theology has no particular problem with statements like 
“The Son, not the Father, is the Redeemer,” as it relates to the specifi c, dif-
ferentiated roles of members of the Trinity. Since having a body is essential 
to the Son’s mission, and only to the Son’s mission, the predicates relating 
to His body do not need to apply to the Father any more than other such 
predicates. Again, this response comes up short. Above all, it enters dense 
philosophical woods by claiming that numerically identical beings can 
have diﬀ erent properties. It also seems to trivialize the Son’s resurrected 
body by consigning it a solely functional purpose. While it may be the case 
that a body is necessary in order to suﬀ er and die for mankind, it seems 
much less the case that having a body is necessary for overcoming death 
and being eternally glorifi ed. Why, then, on this view, did Jesus keep his 
body? Why do we keep our bodies? The Son’s body is not simply related 
to His earthly mission, and thus this response fails.
Finally, the respondent may att empt to argue that it is in some sense 
true that the Father and the Son share a body, perhaps in the sense of 
which the Bible speaks of the unity between husband and wife. Perhaps a 
theory like this could allude to scriptures like Col. 2:9, “For in him dwell-
eth the fullness of the Godhead bodily.” Thus, as the husband’s body is in 
some sense the wife’s, Christ’s body is in some sense the Father’s, remov-
ing the obstacle. Again, though, the response misfi res. We can’t fully say 
that the Son’s body is the Father’s, which we seem required to do in order 
to escape the problems caused by numerical identity. If we can fully say 
that the Son’s body is the Father’s, then it is diﬃ  cult to see how we can 
avoid patripassianism or, in Joseph Smith’s words, “stuﬃ  ng” the Father, 
Son and Holy Ghost into one body. Since both of these are unacceptable to 
traditional theology, this response comes up short. Another account of the 
relationship between the resurrected Son and the Father is in order.
Taking adequate account of the resurrected Son can help future ST 
models adhere to what Cornelius Plantinga calls the minimum “three con-
ditions” that a model must meet to qualify as “a strong or social theory of 
the Trinity”:
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(1) The theory must have Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct centers 
of knowledge, will, love, and action. Since each of these capacities 
requires consciousness, it follows that, on this sort of theory, Father, 
Son, and Spirit would be viewed as distinct centers of consciousness 
or, in short, as persons in some full sense of that term. (2) Any accom-
panying sub-theory of divine simplicity must be modest enough to 
be consistent with condition (1), that is, with the real distinctness of 
trinitarian persons. And (3) Father, Son, and Spirit must be regarded 
as tightly enough related to each other so as to render plausible the 
judgment that they constitute a particular social unit.108
We argue that these three conditions provide a suitable and necessary mea-
suring rod for all theologians seeking to develop a legitimate social model of 
the Trinity. However, biblical correspondence and internal consistency and, 
more particularly, integration with Christ’s bodily resurrection are not the 
only obstacles that ST is presently seeking to overcome. Two other issues 
prominent in ST discourse are those of division of power and the pericho-
retic indwelling of the trinitarian persons. We assert that Smith’s teachings 
come to bear on both these issues where ST currently lack consensus.
(C) Power and Decision Making
If the persons of the Trinity are allowed their real personhood and divin-
ity and therefore real distinctness, many theologians have been concerned 
with how characteristics entailed by their divinity are shared.109 The con-
ventional proposal for such an unsharable characteristic is omnipotence. 
Two theologians who have dealt with this issue at length are Richard 
Swinburne and Timothy Bartel. Both are concerned with the possibility of 
a confl ict of wills or even a “permanent creative stalemate”110 between the 
persons of the Trinity.
While a full critique of their positions lies outside the scope of this 
paper,111 a few comments are in order to clarify the issues of power and 
love in the Trinity. Both assert that in order to rule out a confl ict of wills 
between the three omnipotent beings, each person of the Trinity must 
agree upon some sort of decision-sharing proposal.112 In resolving this 
issue, Swinburne argues for a form of “monarchism” arising out of the 
Son and Holy Ghost’s ontological dependence upon the Father.113 Coined 
by the Cappodocians, “monarchism” expresses the view that the Father 
is the “sole source or sole origin” (Greek “monarchē”) of the Son and the 
Spirit.114 Swinburne suggests that with the Father’s necessary creation of 
the Son and Holy Spirit came a decision-sharing proposal:
Such unity of action could be secured if the fi rst God [i.e., the Father] 
solemnly vows to the second God [the Son] in creating him that he 
will not frustrate any action of his in a certain sphere of activity, and 
expresses the request that in return the second God should not frus-
trate any action of his in the other sphere.115
Bartel, on the other hand, rejects monarchism of any kind on the reason-
ing that,
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“On any natural reading,” monarchism commits us to the inferiority 
of the Son and the Spirit, and that if the Social Trinitarian wants her 
position to be coherent, she ought to hold that none of the members 
of the Trinity depends for his existence on any of the others—a view 
that also lacks a convenient label, but which I propose we should call 
“republicanism.”116
Bartel’s republicanism is of itself not strictly worked out, but he does oﬀ er 
three decision-sharing scenarios that would allow the Trinity to resolve a 
confl ict of wills. The underlying premise of Bartel’s proposals is the complete 
equality of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit such that each person of the 
Trinity may (and presumably does) “table decision-sharing proposals.”117 
The intent of Bartel’s proposals is a unity of will and power such that only 
one will and power are realized and of course only one will is recogniz-
able in divine history. This is equivalent to what Left ow labels “functional 
monotheism.”118 Despite its democratic appeal, Bartel admits an uneasiness 
of abandoning all notions of the supremacy of the Father.119
Which of these, if either, ought the proponent of ST adopt? We argue 
that while well-intentioned and logically plausible, neither Bartel’s nor 
Swinburne’s model does full justice to biblical revelation. In connection 
with this claim, we argue that Smith’s model for decision making and 
power sharing is more biblically consistent and ought to be adopted.
As stated above, Smith explicitly endorses Bartel’s “republicanism” in 
that, according to Smith’s revelations, none of the Persons of the Godhead 
depend on the others for their existence. Moreover, while the Father, Son 
and Holy Ghost each possess their own distinct will, it is the Father’s 
will that each seek to accomplish. This view, we argue, is more in line 
with the Bible. While the idea of such a functional subordination without 
inequality in being is not novel, where Smith’s theology supersedes pre-
vious explanations of divine power sharing is in the why of the submis-
sion. Smith’s aﬃ  rmation that the Son and Holy Ghost submit to will of 
the Father purely out of love is an important addition. As will be more 
fully explicated below, Smith conceived of love as the most “Godlike” 
att ribute. We believe that Christian theology has been unduly infl uenced 
by the idea that power ought to be understood as coercive power.120 Con-
trastingly, Smith taught that “the powers of heaven . . . can or ought to 
be maintained . . . only by persuasion, by long-suﬀ ering, by gentleness 
and meekness and by love unfeigned.”121 The power and decisionmaking 
of the Father is that of love, not of coercion. No person in the Godhead 
would do anything to contravene the freedom of another. Out of love for 
the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost entered before creation into an 
“everlasting covenant”122 to freely submit to the Father’s will.
What has been said above concerning Smith’s view of the immanent 
trinitarian functions may be summarized in four points:
(1)  The Father is the loving head of the Trinity such that he “presides 
over all.”
(2)  Love induces and maintains the operational or functional subordi-
nation of the Son and Holy Ghost to the Father.
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(3) The Son and Holy Ghost are self-existent and, therefore, have onto-
logical equality with the Father.
(4) As a result of (1) and (2), (i) only one will is realized and acted upon 
in salvation history and (ii) it is the will of the Father.
As stated above, we call Smith’s understanding of divine decision making 
“Elyonic Monotheism.” There is but one “Most High God,” the Father,123 
who is loved and obeyed by the Son and Holy Ghost. As set forth “Elyonic 
Monotheism” is a species of the genus “functional monotheism” and is, 
we argue, biblically consistent and rationally persuasive.
(D) Perichoresis and Trinitarian “Glue”
Another ST concept yet to be fully worked out is that of the divine indwell-
ing, or perichoresis.124 The issue arises out of passages such as John 10:38, 
wherein Jesus asserts, “The Father is in me and I am in the Father.”125 Once 
again, while full discussion of the issue lies beyond the scope of this paper, 
a few comments are in order. Some proponents of ST seem to take this 
perichoretic unity as asserting (1) some sort of logically necessary unity or 
(2) some sort of ontological mixing of the persons. We assert that neither 
(1) nor (2) is appropriate and that once again Smith’s insights come to bear 
on the issue.
In regards to (1) consider how St. John Damascene, apparently the fi rst 
person to use the term, illustrates it:
The remaining and residing of one in the other of the three Per-
sons means that they are inseparable and cannot be parted but have 
among themselves a compenetration without confusion, not in such 
a way that they themselves are dissolved in one another or mixed 
together but in such a way that they are joined. . . . One and identical 
is the movement because the impetus and the dynamism of the three 
persons is one, something which is not found in created nature.126
In the contemporary ST debate, this idea of the metaphysical necessity of 
the perichoretic unity is upheld by many, including Cornelius Plantinga. For 
Plantinga, the “patreity, fi leity and spireity” entail the essential relatedness 
of the three persons. Through these relations the persons of the Trinity are 
bound “in unbreakable bonds” which are both “eternal” and “metaphysi-
cal.”127 We have, up to this point, been in agreement with Plantinga’s model; 
however, we cannot follow him on this issue. We suggest that Smith’s in-
sight concerning the nature of love itself must play a central role in conceiv-
ing of the unity of the Godhead.
As stated above, Smith understood the will of intelligent beings to be 
inherently, libertarianly free and viewed love as the defi ning characteristic 
of deity. These two fundamental commitments lead to Smith’s conclusion 
that even friendship amongst “intelligent beings” “must arise from love, 
and that love grows out of virtue.”128 Surely it is an understatement to say 
that the persons of the Godhead are friends, but this principle is easily ex-
trapolated to Smith’s view of the unity of the Godhead, where each divine 
person is indeed an intelligent being. The unity that is maintained cannot 
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be one of coercion of any type, nor can it be simply a matt er of necessity. 
Instead, any and all unity within the Godhead must principally arise and 
be maintained through freely given and freely reciprocated love.129 In this 
view, the binding power of love guarantees the eternal unity of the Trinity 
rather than some mode of logical or metaphysical necessity. If the persons 
of the Trinity are bound either logically or metaphysically, then their unity 
is necessary. However, necessary unity is incompatible with divine free will 
and makes the divine love a hollow form of self-love.130
For “other-love” to obtain, two conditions are necessary. First, the 
other must truly be other. If the very being of one is tied to (or identical 
with) another, they cannot be truly other to each other. The second neces-
sary condition for “other-love” is the possibility (logically at least) of one 
saying “no” to the other. In other words, if one posits divine persons that 
are free, then it is not compossible to also assert necessary unity between 
the three.131 Of course, it might be argued that such a model allows for 
the logical possibility of a split amongst the Persons of the Trinity. In other 
words, in Smith’s model it is logically possible that one member of the 
Trinity could oppose the other’s plans. Some may see this as a defi ciency. 
However, we argue that the utility gained by positing free divine persons 
outweighs this logically possible but practically impossible scenario of 
divine rebellion.
In regards to (2) or the actual elucidation of the perichoretic unity, we 
agree with Dale Tuggy’s critique:
More to the point are dark assertions about the periochoresis or “coin-
herence” or “mutual permeation” (etc.) of the three divine persons. 
The point of these claims, I take it, is that the three persons are some-
how ontologically, or metaphysically, and not just relationally “mixed 
together.” This kind of periochoresis-talk seems fi rmly stuck at the 
metaphorical level. . . . It appears that there is no way to “cash out” 
this metaphor into literal assertion, and that no-one can say why the 
metaphor is appropriate.132
Tuggy’s criticism is ironically validated by those who assert, “the Father and 
the Son mutually indwell one another, and the Holy Spirit, in an ontological 
sense which can never be true of man.”133 While many LDS-specifi c scrip-
tures assert the “indwelling” of the Persons of the Trinity,134 on this issue, 
Smith’s insights serve as a limit to trinitarian theorizing. The logic of real 
love precludes understanding perichoresis in terms of an ontological unity.
Smith’s revelations further limit trinitarian theorizing by their insis-
tence that any talk of trinitarian co-inherence must be informed by Jesus’ 
prayer-promise, “that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and 
I in thee, that they also may be one in us. . . . And the glory which thou 
gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one: I in 
them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one.”135 Thus, peri-
choretic unity claims must be consistent with Jesus’ promise that the same 
kind of indwelling which occurs among the members of the Godhead may 
be achieved by all worthy Christians.
Like other Greek interpolations, perichoresis can be an ambiguous 
word. While many use the term, there remains no consensus concerning 
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its meaning.136 Smith realized that an essential property of divinity is a 
relationship of sacred and intimate unity with the persons of the God-
head. For example, in an 1833 revelation Smith records this perichoretic-
type passage:
I am in the Father, and the Father [is] in me, and the Father and I are 
one—
The Father because he gave me of his fullness, and the Son because 
I was in the world and made fl esh my tabernacle, and dwelt among 
the sons of men.
I was in the world and received of my Father, and the works of him 
were plainly manifest. . . . And he [Christ] received all power both in 
heaven and on earth, and the glory of the Father was with him, for 
he dwelt in him.137
However, the passage does not end there, but ends in a promise much like 
the promise expressed in the John 17 intercessory prayer,
I give unto you these sayings that you may understand and know 
how to worship, and know what you worship, that you may come 
unto the Father in my name, and in due time receive of his fullness. 
For if you keep my commandments you shall receive of his fullness, 
and be glorifi ed in me as I am in the Father; therefore, I say unto you, 
you shall receive grace for grace.138
One of the distinctive theological ideas Smith espoused was this strong 
notion of theosis, wherein all persons are invited to partake of the same 
unity that currently obtains between the Godhead. A social model of the 
Trinity provides a coherent conception of the divine unity which in turn 
provides ordinary Christians with an understandable hope for a future 
unity based on the love exhibited between the members of the Godhead. 
Even critics of ST admit that “This interpretation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity [ST] is commendable to the extent that it depends upon the fun-
damental insight that God is love, and love is something that God wishes 
people to share without condition amongst themselves.”139 To this, Smith 
adds the declaration that God is love and wishes people to share in the 
same love and relationship that currently obtains between the persons of 
the Trinity.
Smith’s conception of the Godhead is thus an especially robust form of 
ST, deeply informed by his view of love as the foremost att ribute of God. 
It clearly distinguishes three divine beings while giving an internally con-
sistent and biblically faithful account of their unity in power and decision, 
and in perichoresis. It explains the sharing of power and decision making 
by recognizing the Father as fount of divinity, distinct in role but freely 
sharing the fullness of divinity with the Son and Holy Ghost. It explains 
perichoresis not through ontology, but as free and intimate cooperation, 
based on love, and hence communicable to all who are willing to fully 
participate in this love.
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V. Conclusion
This paper was an att empt to compare, contrast and involve the beliefs of 
Joseph Smith with the thoughtful and well-articulated views of modern 
trinitarians. In so doing we have defended ST from its theological crit-
ics and argued that Joseph Smith’s understanding of the Trinity throws 
needed light on several of the contemporary issues surrounding ST. We 
maintain that incorporating these insights into the ongoing trinitarian dis-
cussion can help combat what many commentators see as “the current sit-
uation in which we fi nd ourselves, namely, the virtually total irrelevance 
of the doctrine of the Trinity.”140 Surely this is a batt le worth fi ghting.141
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